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Abstract 
The EU-funded research project EMELIE (Electricity Market Liberalisation In Europe) 
wants to provide a sound analysis of the economic and environmental impacts of the  
liberalisation process of the European electricity markets. The EMELIE model simulates 
various market scenarios. The companies in the EMELIE model are assumed to have a 
relatively simple strategy, i.e. profit maximisation, which is constrained by trade limita-
tion, emission quota, and available production capacity for various technologies. 
The Institute for Environmental Studies, IVM, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, partner in 
the EMELIE project, took the initiative to start a complementary line of research. At a 
more detailed level, we investigated business strategies from the perspective of the  
companies themselves: What is their dominant strategy in the process of liberalisation? 
Why do they behave like that? What will be the likely strategy of dominant companies in 
the years to come? And last but not least: how does this most likely strategy fit into the 
stylised EMELIE scenarios? 
In our analysis, we use theories about business behaviour, like the Portfolio Analysis of 
the Boston Consulting Group and Porter's Typology of Business Strategies. We also  
consider two theories that relate to company-authority interactions: Williamson's New 
Institutional Economics that compares market failures with government failures and  
Tinbergen's Theory of Economic Policy, that warns for exaggerated expectations of a 
single policy instrument, in this case market liberalisation. 
We observe that the liberalisation process has brought about a wave of mergers and  
acquisitions, resulting in concentrated markets. Concentration Standards of Competition 
Authorities decide on maximum concentration levels, not the market itself.  
The trend towards market concentration originates because dominant companies want to 
avoid price competition and consider strategic market behaviour in their best interest. 
These expansionist’ companies prefer proven production technologies with low variable 
costs like coal, lignite, nuclear and hydro. They want to retain an integrated business 
structure, being active in electricity production, trade, distribution and sales. The  
dominant players leave it to niche players to experiment with new production (e.g.  
renewable energy sources) and trade arrangements.  
Market concentration remains the dominant trend. Because Regulators will not accept 
more mergers at the national scale, dominant companies look for international opportuni-
ties. We expect that, as soon as public shares become available to private companies,  
international cross-ownership will increase. To prevent quasi-monopolies, forced  
splitting of companies comes into the picture. France and Belgium are candidates, but 
perhaps Germany and the Netherlands as well. 
As for environmental protection, separate instruments at the EU and national levels have 
to remain. As for security of supply, discussions focus on instruments to guarantee  
sufficient generating capacity. The necessity to introduce new instruments in order to 
guarantee security of supply is hotly debated, but undecided yet. 
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1. Introduction 
Liberalisation of electricity markets in the EU is in full swing. According to EU  
Directives, full liberalisation must be accomplished by 2007 in all member states. In the 
Netherlands, market opening will be completed in July 2004 when households are free to 
choose their electricity provider. Nordic countries, Germany and UK have liberalised 
their energy markets earlier, countries like France and Belgium will follow later. 
The EU- funded research project EMELIE (Electricity Market Liberalisation In Europe) 
wants to provide a sound analysis of the economic and environmental impacts of the  
liberalisation process of the European energy markets. The project investigates various 
scenarios given the dynamics of the electricity markets, taking into consideration market 
power and leadership, cross ownership, electricity trading, environmental constraints, 
and emission permits. In its present form, the EMELIE model includes eight European 
countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Sweden (EMELIE, 2004).  
EMELIE is a computational game theoretic optimisation model. Companies in the model 
are assumed to have a relatively simple strategic objective, i.e. profit maximisation, 
which is constrained by trade limitation, emission quota, and available production  
capacity for various technologies. When EMELIE speaks about companies, it means 
producers of electricity. Traders of electricity that do not own power plants are not  
covered by EMELIE. 
The Institute for Environmental Studies, IVM, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, partner in 
the EMELIE project, took the initiative to start a complementary line of research. At a 
more detailed level, we investigate business strategies from the perspective of the com-
panies themselves: What is their dominant strategy in the process of liberalisation? 
Why do they behave like that? Do they see alternatives? How do they consider their  
competitors? And last but not least: What will be the likely strategy of dominant  
companies in the years to come? And how does this most likely strategy fit into the 
 stylised EMELIE scenarios? 
This report starts by presenting relevant theories about business behaviour. Chapter 2  
explains differences between strategic, tactical and operational business management. 
We focus on strategic and tactical management, because medium and long-term business 
decisions will be decisive for the future of electricity markets.  
Chapter 3 presents propositions about business behaviour, derived from Portfolio  
Analysis of the Boston Consulting Group and Porter's Typology of Business Strategies.  
Chapter 3 also considers two theories that relate to company-authority interactions:  
Williamson's New Institutional Economics that compares market failures with govern-
ment failures and Tinbergen's Theory of Economic Policy, that warns for exaggerated 
expectations of a single policy instrument. Is it realistic to expect that a single  
instrument, liberalisation, will bring the various societal benefits that the EU expects? 
In Chapter 4 we analyse the present business structure in the EMELIE countries and how 
this structure came into being. Market concentration has been the dominating trend. 
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Chapter 5 discusses evidence on business strategies, while Chapter 6 discusses evidence 
on business-government interactions. The focus of this enquiry is on developments in the 
Netherlands, but lessons from countries where liberalisation is more advanced are in-
cluded as well.  
Based on the evidence presented in Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 draws conclusions on 
our analysis of business strategies. Chapter 7 rounds off with implications for the use of 
the EMELIE model. 
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2. Business strategies and business tactics 
In business literature, it is common to distinguish between strategic, tactical and  
operational management (Keuning and Eppink, 1987). Each type of management focuses 
on specific aspects of corporate policies (Table 2.1).  
Strategic decisions relate to the long-term direction of a company. Business strategies  
relate to fundamental decisions management has to make about e.g. changes in product-
market combinations and investments in production capacity. Investments in industrial 
production capacity typically last 10 years or more, investments in power plants typically 
last 30 years or more. Business tactics relate to medium term use of production capacity. 
In its tactical decisions, a company plans an optimal use of existing production capacity 
in relation to changes in markets, prices etc. The dominant goal is an ex ante optimal 
timing of business initiatives over several years, e.g. introduction of new products and 
bringing into operation of new equipment. In a sector with long-lasting assets, like  
electricity production, the realm of tactical planning can extend up to 10 years.  
Operational management relates to short-term implementation of business plans. In the 
current market turbulence, flexibility in day-to-day operations has become just as impor-
tant as efficiency in production. A good example of operational management is the ne-
cessity to buy and sell KWh on the recently started power exchanges. Operating a deal-
ing room for electricity demands specific skills like analysing price fluctuations and risk 
hedging (Van Grieken, 2004). In all sectors, also in electricity production, operational 
management fits within the annual planning–budgeting–monitoring–reporting cycle.  
Table 2.1 Types of management decisions. 
Type Focus Capacity investment Time span 
Strategic Product- market combinations; 
Investment in production capacity 
Yes > 5 years 
Tactical Introduction of new products; 
Use of production capacity  
No 1- 4 years 
Operational Marketing actions; 
Running of production processes 
No < 1 year 
Source: Keuning and Eppink, 1987. 
 
It must be kept in mind that borderlines between strategic, tactical and operational  
management are fluid. Moreover, successful management requires that all management 
functions are taken care of simultaneously. However, Table 2.1 provides a useful frame-
work to assess the relationships between a multitude of business decisions.  
With regard to electricity production in a liberalised market, strategic plans could include 
goals for the product-market mix (type of clients, service areas, niche markets) and for 
investments (acquisitions, power plants, fuel mix). In contrast, tactical plans contain a 
plan to use production capacity, a plan to enter new markets and guidelines for contin-
gent responses to unforeseeable developments (equipment failure, power market).  
Operational management is responsible for day-to-day operations and for flexible  
responses to emergent problems and opportunities.  
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For the time being, we assume that a company in a liberalised market strives for  
conscious use of short-term market opportunities. This can take the form of active  
participation in newly emerging trading platforms (e.g. the Amsterdam Power Exchange 
APX), but also of a flexible use of production capacity in response to short-term price 
fluctuations or of the use of production capacity to induce price fluctuations (e.g. artifi-
cial scarcity of electricity in the network). A conscious use of market opportunities as-
sumes a set of guiding principles that ideally are included in the tactical planning. We 
assume that these guidelines can be inferred from operational business decisions. There-
fore, in the rest of this report operational management will not be a separate topic of  
research. We will distinguish between strategic management and tactical management. 
The main difference is that while in tactical management production capacity is fixed, in 
strategic management it is not.  
A liberalised market puts much higher demands on corporate planning than planning in 
the traditional -quasi monopoly- power market. In a traditional setting the product-
market mix is given (a homogeneous product is delivered to all clients in the service 
area) and investments relate to physical equipment only (acquisitions are not allowed; 
the fuel mix is heavily influenced by national energy policies). A tactical plan of a  
traditional company typically concerns the technical use of production capacity and 
emergency planning for equipment failure. Plans to enter new markets and plans to use 
market power are seen with suspicion. Comparing the demands on strategic planning by 
liberalised companies with the demands on strategic planning by traditional companies, 
it is fair to say that market liberalisation requires a complete re-invention of electricity 
companies. Traditional knowledge is insufficient to be successful on the emerging  
markets. Corporate learning and acquisition of missing knowledge are at the core of  
success in such changed market conditions.  
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the relations between strategic and tactical manage-
ment and the (sub) models of the EMELIE project. 
Table 2.2 Management decisions of electricity producers and EMELIE models. 
Type of decision Capacity investments EMELIE model 
Tactical decisions 
Transition period 2004-2007 
No Static model 
Strategic decisions-  
Transition period 2004-2007  
Probably not Static model 
Strategic decisions- 
Liberalised markets after 2007 
Yes Dynamic model 
NB 1  Mergers and acquisitions, to be discussed in Chapter 4, have both strategic (new  
markets) and tactical (no investments in new physical capacity) aspects. 
NB 2  Operational decisions are not considered separately, because we suppose that tactical 
  plans provide guidelines on how to react to short-run market risks and opportunities.  
 
The static EMELIE model analyses the impacts of liberalisation in the present capacity 
structure. Investment decisions were not considered. Therefore, the static EMILIE model 
relates to tactical planning of electricity companies.  
Even in the short-term capacity decisions play a role, especially at the firm level. For  
example, if nuclear has to be replaced, investments in new capacity have to be prepared. 
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Because impact on overall capacity remains limited, it is still acceptable not to consider 
capacity investments in the 2004-2007 period. 
The dynamic EMELIE model -now under construction- takes a longer time horizon and 
allows for investments by expanding production capacity. Therefore, dynamic EMELIE 
models relate to strategic planning of electricity companies. Because building of new 
capacity implies use for commercial benefit, tactical use of the resulting capacity is  
included as well. 
According to EU Electricity Directive 2003/54/EC, full liberalisation must be accom-
plished in 2007 (EU, 2003). The period 2004-2007 will be full of uncertainties. Every 
EU country follows a specific path towards the 2007 targets. This makes it useful to  
distinguish between business strategies for the implementation period 2004-2007 and  
business strategies for liberalised markets after 2007. For electricity providers, the 2004-
2007 period will certainly be a period of turbulence. In a period of turbulence,  
companies are inclined to follow a 'wait and see' strategy, postponing big investments 
and keeping as many options open as possible (Wolmar, 2001). If companies deliber-
ately avoid investments in new equipment, their strategy boils down to tactical use of  
existing capacity. Therefore, we expect the static EMILIE model be useful to study  
tactical planning but also to study strategic behaviour in the 2004-2007 period. The dy-
namic EMELIE model finds their proper place in an analysis of strategic planning for 
the period after 2007. 
EMELIE is a computational game theoretic optimisation model, which considers besides 
physical aspects also markets, where size and ownership matter as well. Large and super 
large companies are able to influence market prices. In case of monopoly (a single  
dominant supplier) and oligopoly (a few dominant suppliers), corporate decisions are 
important for market results. A continuing dominance of oligopoly in electricity markets 
seems to be a realistic assumption (AER, 2003). A complication to the standard oligo-
poly model is cross-ownership, i.e. when large companies own subsidiaries in other  
markets. Cross-ownership has a potentially large influence on market outcomes, because 
cross-ownership increases market power (Amundsen and Bergmann, 2002). Chapter 4 
analyses the energy markets in the EMELIE countries, the main actors in these countries 
and the occurrence of cross ownership.  
But before we analyse these markets, the next chapter discusses theories about business 
behaviour and derive some propositions for the electricity market. 
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3. Theories about business behaviour 
In this chapter we present theories that can help us to understand business strategies and 
business-policy interactions. Theories about business strategies originate from business 
economic literature. In order to understand business-policy interactions we use economic 
theories of government policy. The theories are well established in their fields of  
research. At the end of each section, we will formulate propositions on how the theory 
might work out in the field of electricity companies. In Chapter 5 we will test the propo-
sitions on business strategies, in Chapter 6 we test the propositions on business-policy 
interactions. 
The following two theories on business strategies start from an analysis of product-
market combinations. The portfolio analysis of the Boston Consulting Group shows 
dominant business strategies depending on the position of products in their relevant  
markets. Porter has developed a typology of business strategies a company can use to 
improve its market position. 
Since the 1980s, Williamson has developed a set of theories that have become known as 
New Institutional Economics. Basically, these theories present a unified framework to 
analyse both market and government failures. In his seminal work on the theory of  
economic policy, Tinbergen has shown that a regulatory system must not be over-
burdened. We think Tinbergen's principles remain valid to assess the frequently confused 
discussions that parallel the liberalisation process of EU electricity markets. 
3.1 Portfolio analysis of the Boston consulting group 
The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) has developed a matrix to assess risks and oppor-
tunities of product-market combinations. The two sides of the matrix are overall market 
growth and market share (Table 3.1). Attractiveness of a product-market combination is 
not measured with profitability, but with cash-flow (= profits + depreciation). The idea is 
that in an ideal business Portfolio (= the set of product-market operations in which a 
company operates) cash cows generate enough cash flow to invest in loss-making wild 
cats or stars (Keuning and Eppink, 1987).  
The 'Internet hype' of 2000 is a beautiful example of an explosion of -externally  
financed- wild cats, of which only a limited number has survived as a star. After the dust 
of the 'Internet Bubble' had drifted down, established companies with a positive cash 
flow (MicroSoft, IBM, but also mail-order firms) acquired the knowledge collected by 
the stars. 
Table 3.1 Portfolio Analysis of Boston Consulting Group. 
 Market share   
Market growth High Low 
High Star 
Cash flow 0 
Wild cat 
Cash flow negative 
Low Cash cow 
Cash flow positive 
Dog 
Cash flow 0 
Source: Keuning and Eppink, 1987. 
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Electricity production is capital intensive, and therefore the annual sum of depreciation is 
high. This means, on the one hand, that existing equipment is used as long as variable 
costs are recovered, because in that case the cash flow remains positive. Moreover,  
established companies with small profits show large cash flows that are available for  
investments. On the other hand, there is a high threshold to invest in new capacity if it is 
uncertain whether investments can be recovered over a very long period (10 to 30 years). 
Making capacity operational takes many years and hence there is a long delay before 
revenues from the new unit will start coming in. This delay is also too slow for a desired 
increase in market power. These are the reasons why in the 2004-2007 implementation 
period of EU liberalisation, companies probably will be hesitant to invest in new physi-
cal capacity (Speck and Mulder, 2003). Rather, established companies with a positive 
cash flow will prefer to acquire other companies, because of the immediate availability 
of capacity and –of course– market power. A higher market share brings instant  
additional cash flow, which enables another round of acquisitions, etc.   
The dividing line in Table 3.1 between 'high' and 'low' market growth is the structural 
growth of gross domestic product (GDP; Keuning and Eppink, 1987). It is expected that 
overall demand for electricity in the EU will increase more or less in line with GDP 
(EIA, 2000). Because renewables and other non-traditional types of electricity produc-
tion should get an increasing part of the market, we assume that traditional power plants 
(fossil fuels, nuclear) fit in the boxes with low market growth. Therefore, we expect that 
well-established electricity companies will follow a cash cow strategy. In the Nether-
lands, the foreign operators E-on and Electrabel are candidates for the 'cash cow'  
category. In Chapters 4 and 5, we discuss their behaviour.   
The BCG matrix assumes that companies with a high market share benefit because they 
can use the 'experience effect'. In the electricity sector, one can think of learning effects 
of a diversified portfolio of generating techniques and of market experience in diversi-
fied markets. We suggest that a minimum amount of 'experience' is necessary to survive 
in an EU-wide market. This means that companies with a small, strictly national based 
experience will dwindle to a dog position. Being competed at their home markets with-
out being able to acquire a substantial position abroad, in the long run they have no  
alternative than being bought by a large player on the market. In the Neherlands, the  
incumbent companies Nuon and Essent, who have been unable to develop substantial 
business abroad, run the risk of coming into a 'dog' position. In Chapters 4 and 5, we  
discuss their position further.   
Several authors describe the electricity sector as conservative. The sector misses a drive 
for innovation (Ederer, 2003; Kunneke, 2003). Innovators are needed at both the  
production and marketing sides. Innovation is inherently risky, the more so in turbulent 
markets. In this respect, the 2004-2007 market turmoil does not favour innovation. On 
the other hand, companies are manoeuvring to get an optimal starting position for the 
post 2007 situation. We expect a development similar to the 'Internet-hype' of 1998-
2000. This means that in the 2004-2007 period a lot of initiatives will be tested. Several 
wild cats may be financed by established companies. As long as wild cats focus on  
trading and selling, they do not have to invest in generation or networks. Therefore, low 
investments suffice to start a trading company.  
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Only after 2007, most of the successful stars will be acquired by large players on the 
electricity market. In the meantime, most wild cats will die and be forgotten. 
From the BCG Portfolio Analysis we derive the following three propositions. In Chapter 
5 we will test these propositions.  
• Proposition 1: Large players on the European electricity market will show a 'cash 
cow' strategy. They will invest their cash-flow with the aim to increase market 
shares. Therefore, large players will acquire smaller companies.  
• Proposition 2: Small players on the European electricity market will end up in a 
'dog' strategy. Their only way out is to be taken over by a large company. 
• Proposition 3: In the 2004-2007 transition period, innovation will be driven by small 
companies. Most of these 'wild cats' will not survive. Remaining 'stars' will in due 
course be acquired by large players in the electricity market.  
3.2 Porter's typology of business strategies 
Options for growth of a company are basically twofold: On the one hand a company can 
aim for expansion (grow in the existing product-market mix), on the other hand a com-
pany can diversify (enter into new product-market combinations). Porter has developed 
the options for growth into a typology of business strategies (Porter, 1985). He distin-
guishes three types of strategies: 
1. Low cost strategy : Produce cheaper than competitors; 
2. Differentiation strategy: Introduce a new product; 
3. Focus strategy: Focus on specific parts of the market. 
Table 3.2 Typology of Business Strategies. 
 Dominant strat-
egy 
 Sub strategy Characteristics 
1 Low cost   Cheaper than competitors 
2 Differentiation   New products 
3 Focus 3A
3B 
Low cost focus 
Differentiation focus 
Cheaper than competitors in sub markets 
New products for specific target groups  
Source: Porter, 1985. 
 
Table 3.2 provides an overview of the Porter typology. What will be promising options 
for electricity producers? In the traditional setting, a homogeneous product is delivered 
to all clients. In such circumstances, the low cost strategy is the only possible option. 
The development of 'green electricity' in the1990s brought the other strategies into play. 
In the Netherlands, green electricity started as a differentiation focus (a more expensive 
type of electricity could be sold to a small group of environmentally conscious con-
sumers). Government support for both production (investment subsidies) and consump-
tion (exemption of eco-tax for renewables) enabled the expansion of green electricity 
into a differentiation strategy (Hofman, 2003). However, for reasons to be explained in 
Chapter 5, a 2003 policy change introduced eco-tax on renewables and reformulated  
investment subsidies (Linderhof et al., 2003). As a result, the future of consumer green 
electricity in the Netherlands has become less certain (Van Damme and Zwart, 2003).  
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Because electricity is a homogeneous good, it is not obvious to find other differentiations 
on the electricity market.  
Full market opening in the EU to non-households (2004) will be earlier than the market 
opening to households (2007). This opens opportunities for focus strategies aiming at 
commercial electricity users. So far, competition for industrial users focused on the  
supply of cheap electricity. In the Netherlands, large industries demand cheap imports of 
German (coal) and French (nuclear) electricity (Verwer, 2003). In commercial markets, 
the low cost focus seems most promising. 
The Porter typology enables us to formulate two propositions about business strategies. 
In Chapter 5 we test these propositions. 
• Proposition 4: The low cost strategy will be dominant for electricity producers, both 
in traditional markets and in emergent focus markets; 
• Proposition 5: A differentiation strategy will only be possible with financial support 
of governments. Without government support, product innovations will be trapped in 
a differentiation focus, serving fringe markets only.  
3.3 Williamson's new institutional economics 
Markets do not always offer the optimal solution for social welfare. Market failure can 
take several forms. Next to externalities like environmental pollution, 'natural monopo-
lies' like electricity production were until recently considered unsuitable for normal 
competition. On the other hand, government regulations will also come at certain costs. 
Examples of government failure are lack of efficiency and political interference with 
management decisions.  
How to balance market and government failures? How to achieve an optimal regime of 
governance? And do optimal regimes change over time? These are core questions of the 
New Institutional Economics (NIE), developed by Williamson since the 1970s. The basic 
question of NIE is: why do institutions emerge the way they do and not otherwise? Since 
the 1980s, the NIE framework has been extended from business optimalisation issues to 
public policy issues, for example the development of regulatory regimes (Williamson, 
1998). Changes in regulatory regimes are the core of the whole process of electricity  
liberalisation in the EU. Therefore, the NIE may offer guidance in the liberalisation  
process. 
NIE make transaction costs explicit and show their role in various organisational set-
tings. NEI assume that for every situation management chooses the organisation with 
minimal transaction costs. Transaction costs are the sum of contact (information costs), 
contract and control costs (monitoring costs). According to NIE, various institutions like 
markets, hierarchies and regulatory agencies differ in information, co-ordination and 
monitoring costs. As a consequence, each problem has an optimal mode of organisation, 
supported by a distinctive form of contract law (Williamson, 1998). 
The EU Directives provide the principles of a liberalised electricity market. In the im-
plementation phase a major reshuffling of companies and institutions will take place. In 
the old situation, the organisation of the Dutch electricity sector was simple: a limited 
number of integrated regional monopolies, an operator of the national grid SEP and one 
Ministry for guidance and general supervision (Table 3.1). Because the national grid was 
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co-owned by the regional monopolies, all business activities were co-ordinated by hier-
archy and co-operation. All companies were in public ownership. There was a free flow 
of information between the regional producers and the national grid, implying low  
information and monitoring costs. It was clear that the regional monopolist was respon-
sible for security of supply. This system has brought about a high quality system of  
electricity supply. Critics, however, argue that the system of regulated monopolies has 
been unnecessary costly (Groeneboom, 2003). 
As a result of EU directives, there will be a plethora of new companies and institutions. 
The unbundling of transmission from other activities means that integrated companies 
have to split. New companies will try to enter the market. The Dutch government  
favours that both national and regional networks remain publicly owned (Energie Neder-
land, 2004A). Because of inherently monopolistic tendencies in the electricity market, an 
energy regulator DTe will supervise competitive behaviour of networks, while the  
competition watchdog NMA must prevent anti-competitive behaviour of electricity  
producers, traders and sellers. 
Tabel 3.1 Actors in the Dutch electricity market. 
 Before liberalisation  After liberalisation 
 Companies   
1 Integrated regional monopolies 
(production, regional networks, sales) 
1A 
1B 
1C 
Production companies 
Regional networks (public ownership) 
Trading and sales  
2 National grid SEP 
 (co-owned by regional monopolies)  
2 National grid TenneT 
(public ownership)   
  3 Amsterdam Power Exchange APX 
(spot market for electricity) 
 Authorities   
1 Ministry of Economic Affairs 1 Ministry of Economic Affairs 
  2A Energy Regulator Dte  
  2B Netherlands Competition Authority NMA 
Source: Oosterhuis et al., 2003.  
 
The plethora of new actors also implies that a diversified set of co-ordination  
mechanisms is emerging. Co-ordination will remain in the network sector only. Between 
several types of companies, market relations will be dominant. In a competitive market, 
the flow of confidential information will be reduced. This complicates monitoring of the 
electricity system (Oosterhuis et al, 2003). Finally, energy regulators will introduce a 
new type of government regulation that will go along with lawsuits. As yet, it is not clear 
how public bodies can arrange for the security of supply, as stipulated in EU Directive 
2003/54/EC.  
Markets are a powerful instrument for co-ordination. In case of full competition, trans-
action costs are less than those in other types of co-ordination (Williamson, 1998). How-
ever, the Dutch electricity market changes from regional monopoly into regulated  
oligopoly. As long as costs of networks (national and regional), of market intermediates 
(like APX), and of regulatory authorities are internalised in electricity prices to custom-
ers, a fair comparison between costs ex ante and costs ex post seems possible. However, 
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if certain costs after regulation are borne by the public sector (agencies; investments;  
capacity auctions?), these have to be added to the costs of the private companies.  
As yet, consequences of liberalisation for transaction costs are badly understood. That 
brings us to Proposition 6, to be discussed in Chapter 6. 
• Proposition 6: The Dutch electricity markets will change from a regional monopoly 
into a regulated oligopoly. It is not a priori clear whether social welfare, including 
transaction costs, in the new situation will be higher than in the old situation. 
3.4 Tinbergen's theory of economic policy 
The aim of liberalisation of electricity markets is to increase efficiency of production and 
supply of electricity by introducing competitive forces into the market, and to create one 
European electricity market. Increased efficiency would lead to lower prices to the  
customers (EU, 2003). This connection between policy goal (lower price) and policy  
instrument (liberalisation) is rather straightforward. However, a low price is not the only 
goal of energy policies. Security of supply and the promotion of renewable energy are 
also core elements of EU and national electricity policies (EU, 2003; Groenenboom, 
2003). What is the relation between the multitude of policy goals and liberalisation?  
Table 3.4 shows our preliminary interpretation. We expect that liberalisation is suitable 
to accomplish market related goals on prices and quality (goals 1,2,3,5), but that wider 
social goals like security of supply (goal 4) and environmental protection (goal 6) are not 
automatically catered for. 
Table 3.2 Liberalisation and goals of EU electricity policy. 
 Policy goals Liberalisation a suitable instrument? 
1 Introduction of competition Yes 
2 Market opening for all consumers Yes 
3 Economical prices Yes 
4 Security of supply Questionable 
5 Service quality Probably yes 
6 Environmental protection No 
Source: EU, 2003. 
 
In his seminal work on Theory of economic policy, Tinbergen has shown that, generally 
speaking, every goal of economic policy requires a separate policy instrument. It is a 
mere coincidence if one instrument can reach different goals simultaneously (Tinbergen, 
1954).  
If we apply Tinbergen’s principle to the electricity sector, it will be a great achievement 
if liberalisation results in lower prices and good service. However, it is naive to expect 
that liberalisation will automatically favour other policy goals such as security of supply 
and sustainable production. As for introduction of renewable energy sources, both EU 
and national governments accept that separate policy instruments remain necessary in the 
foreseeable future (Bongaerts et al., 2003). With regard to security of supply, the belief 
gets stronger that liberalisation per se will not provide the answer. A plethora of  
additional instruments is now entering the policy discussions (see Chapter 6 for a  
discussion).  
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It is interesting to note that in the pre-liberalisation period, policy goals like security of 
supply and environmental protection were combined because the integrated Dutch  
electricity companies worked together on a basis of co-operation and hierarchy 
(=internal co-ordination in Williamson's NIE system). This system enabled a  
co-ordinated provision of “mothball” capacity and concerted actions to promote  
renewable energy sources.  
Market analysts attribute the high costs of the present electricity system to excessive  
demands on quality, i.e. they see excessive demands on security of supply. They wonder 
whether more regular blackouts -compensated by lower costs- could increase social wel-
fare (Groenenboom, 2003; De Joode et al., 2004). A recent survey among Dutch house-
holds indicates that Dutch households appreciate the high security of supply (statistically 
there is one blackout in four years). According to the survey, Dutch households would 
conditionally –provided that they get financial compensation- accept a deterioration of 
the quality level to one or two blackouts a year (Baarsma, 2004). 
In a theoretical sense, if lower prices go along with lower quality, it is no longer possible 
to say unambiguously whether social welfare has increased or not. Only in case that 
costs decrease while quality remains equal, a Pareto improvement of social welfare is 
unambiguous. In our opinion, minimum quality requirements for captive users (consum-
ers and small companies) must be guaranteed by the government because -contrary to 
large companies- captive users have no market power to negotiate over quality levels. 
Therefore, we welcome the plans of the newly established regulatory agencies to  
implement and enforce new standards for security of supply (Shestalova, 2002).  
The discussion on policy instruments brings us to the following two propositions.  
We discuss these propositions in Chapter 6. 
• Proposition 7: The policy goal 'security of supply' demands policy instruments  
additional to the measures stipulated in the EU Directive 2003/54/EC on electricity 
liberalisation; 
• Proposition 8: The policy goal 'environmental protection' demands policy  
instruments additional to the measures stipulated in the EU Directive 2003/54/EC on  
electricity liberalisation; 
• Proposition 9: Public agencies have to provide standards for security of supply for 
captive users. Public agencies must also get the instruments to enforce these  
standards. 
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4. Market players in eight European countries 
In this chapter we describe the 2004 business structure in the EMELIE countries and 
analyse how this structure came into being. The keyword will be market concentration.  
4.1 Market structure in 2004 
In April 2004, we collected data about electricity companies in the countries in the 
EMELIE project: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands,  
Norway, and Sweden. The following information concentrates on integrated companies 
that have dominant positions in their markets. All information was collected from the 
Internet. Most important sources of information were the Annual Reports over 2003,  
available at the companies’ websites. 
In total, we compiled information on 17 companies that dominate electricity production 
in the eight EMELIE countries. Below, we present generic conclusions about the type of 
companies and their interrelations. Annexes 1 and 2 contain information about the type, 
production and sales of each company. 
In April 2004, in the 8 EMELIE countries 17 integrated companies were active (Table 
4.1). The number of dominant companies varied between 1 (Belgium, France) and 4 
(Germany, Netherlands).  
Table 4.1 Overview of integrated electricity companies. 
Country  Company Subsidiary of 
Germany 1 E.ON - 
 2 RWE - 
 3 EnBW EDF minority share (35%) 
 4 Vattenfall Deutschland Vattenfall Sweden  
France 5 EDF - 
Belgium 6 Electrabel * - 
Netherlands 7 Nuon - 
 8 Essent - 
 9 E.ON Benelux E.ON Germany  
 10 Electrabel* Electrabel Belgium 
Sweden 11 Vattenfall - 
 12 Sydkraft E.ON Germany (55%)+ Statkraft Norway (45%) 
 13 Fortum Fortum Finland 
Finland 14 Fortum - 
 15 PVO - 
Norway 16 Statkraft - 
Denmark 17 Elsam - 
 18 Energi E2 - 
* Electrabel is a subsidiary of the French conglomerate Suez.  
Source: company websites April 2004. 
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Of the 17 companies, 12 companies were independent; the remaining 5 were subsidiaries 
(Table 4.2). Of the 5 subsidiaries, all had their parent company in another EMELIE 
country.  
Table 4.2 Cross ownership of the 17 integrated companies. 
 Parent company Subsidiaries   
1 E.ON Energie (DE) E.ON Benelux NL  
Sydkraft SE  
(100%) 
(55%) 
2 Vattenfall (SE) Vattenfall Deutschland  (94%) 
3 Electrabel (BE) Electrabel NL (100%) 
4 Fortum (FI) Fortum SE  (100%) 
5 EDF (FR) EnBW DE (35%) 
6 Statkraft (NO) Sydkraft SE (45%) 
Source: Annual Reports 2003. 
Note: % of shares. 
 
Of the 12 independent companies, only 2 were privately owned (E.ON and Electrabel). 
Four companies were state owned (EDF, Vattenfall, Fortum and Statkraft), while the  
remaining 6 companies were owned by regional/local authorities. 
The 12 independent companies varied considerably in size. Based on production volume, 
we found big companies in Germany, France, Belgium (Electrabel) and Sweden (Vatten-
fall). Medium-sized companies were in the Netherlands, Finland and Norway and we 
found small companies in Denmark. The big companies have been able to get market 
shares in other countries; the small and medium sized companies have so far been un-
successful to do so. 
There is a common opinion that electricity markets are very concentrated. Calculation of 
both Concentration Ratios and the so-called Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) show 
that the electricity sector is indeed a highly concentrated market (Speck and Mulder, 
2003; Matthes and Poetzsch, 2002; Kemfert et al., 2003). Table 4.3 provides evidence 
for the EMELIE countries. 
The fuel mix differs considerably between the EMELIE countries (Kemfert et al., 2003). 
Also within countries, the fuel mix can differ between companies. A good example is 
Germany where the fuel mixes of E.ON, RWE and EnBW are quite different. Whereas 
E.ON leans heavily on nuclear power, for RWE lignite is most important, while EnBW 
has a relatively high share of hydropower (Annex 2). In other countries, the fuel mixes 
between competing companies are almost similar. Sweden is a good example, where as a 
result of historical agreements the nuclear power plants are co-owned by Vattenfall and 
Sydkraft, while the large variety in hydropower offered many opportunities for acquisi-
tion. 
4.2 Market trends in the 1998-2004 period 
When we compare the 2004 situation with the 1998 situation, it becomes clear that  
electricity markets are concentrating at a fast pace. The 5 subsidiaries in Table 4.2 were 
independent, publicly owned companies until 2000. 
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Table 4.3 Market concentration. 
Country  HHI CR1(%) CR3(%) 
Germany 1998, Pre merger 1000/1560 29/22 58/43 
 2002, Post Merger 1400/2417 37/25 76/60 
Benelux+FR  1500 30 55 
Netherlands 2000 1400/1796 30/19 68/49 
 2004, corrected for imports 1750 34 81 
France  8836 94/90 98/92 
Belgium  7396 87/86 95/94 
Scandinavia  892/1264 20 39 
Sweden  2900 46 87 
Explanation: various sources provide different numbers.  
The numbers in Table 4.3 show upper and lower limits. 
-A HHI greater than 1800 indicates a concentrated market;  
-A CR1 (market share of biggest company) greater than 40% indicates a concentrated market; 
-A CR3 (market share of 3 biggest companies) greater than 50% indicates a concentrated market.  
Sources: Brunekreeft(2002), Matthes and Poetzsch (2002), Pena(2003), Speck and Mulder  
(2003), EIA (2003), DTe (2004). 
 
From the Top Thirty of European Power Companies in 2001 (www.eurelectric.org), in 
2004 8 companies have disappeared as independent companies because of take-overs. A 
more detailed analysis of the merger and acquisition (M&A) pattern since 1998 reveals 
the following. 
Before 1990s, European electricity markets have been segmented national markets with 
only voluntary exchange in cross-border relations. Each country had its own historically 
grown structures: for example the public monopoly of Electricite de France (EDF) in 
France and almost thousand electricity companies with 9 “big ones” in Germany  
(Stroebele 2003). Different legal starting points and regulatory approaches, different 
technical and commercial infrastructures caused various developments and resulted in 
different market structures: 
• One group of “south-west European” countries started from a concentrated, vertically 
and horizontally integrated industrial structure (United Kingdom, France, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Portugal). From these countries, only the United Kingdom 
and Italy implemented free market competition. In the United Kingdom, the mono-
polistic block was fully unbundled and split in a large number of private, indepen-
dent generation and distributing companies. The other extremes are France and  
Belgium, where the domestic quasi-monopolies (public in France, private in Bel-
gium) were preserved; 
• Another group of “north-east European” countries had a lower level of integration 
and a large number of operators (Germany, the Netherlands, Scandinavia). Here  
liberalisation caused the opposite development: a number of mergers and  
acquisitions (M&A) and a significant horizontal and vertical concentration process, 
particularly in Sweden, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands. In Germany and the 
Netherlands 2/3 of the largest producers lost their independence in the first 3 years of 
the reform. 
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As we will see, these different industrial cultures and developments affected the  
direction of business strategies and M&A activities: in the EMELIE countries, we have 
two quasi-monopolies (France, Belgium) and two countries that experienced concentra-
tion (Germany, the Netherlands). In these four countries together, market concentration 
increased in the 1998-2004 period. In the Scandinavian countries, business concentration 
competed with market expansion (the separate markets of Sweden, Finland, Denmark 
and Norway have been integrated into a common Pool). 
Companies situated in countries that were at the forefront of liberalisation (United King-
dom, Scandinavia, Germany) were particularly active to maximise scale and financial 
power by integrating municipal companies and to expand scope (multi-utilities) in their 
domestic arenas. Domestic mergers, therefore, dominated particularly in the afore-
mentioned countries. In the southern countries the few monopolistic, public or private 
firms were controlled by the central government and municipals, limiting internal merg-
ers, privatisation and market openness. Particularly in France, the governmental control 
cut France off from foreign deals.  
Mergers, acquisitions and intentions to grow are also a question of money: large compa-
nies with strong financial power, situated in large markets, but with limited potential for 
further growth (France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden) invested over-proportionally 
abroad. In smaller countries or countries with a strong central regulating influence, these 
opportunities were more restricted, and companies from these countries (Denmark, the 
Netherlands, but also United Kingdom and Austria) did not invest to a significant degree 
abroad. Table 4.2 in Section 4.1 already showed the results. 
In historic perspective, the number and value of M&A increased dramatically as soon as 
liberalisation cached most European countries mid 1990s. A number of multinational 
companies acted as driving force for M&A in Europe, mainly EDF, E.ON, RWE,  
Vattenfall, Electrabel (Suez) and Endesa. The proactive companies expanded  
enormously in scale and scope in the recent years and they are still continuing to expand. 
The gap between the mega-players EDF, RWE, E.ON and the other companies has  
increased (PwC 2003; Appendix II), and the powerful – in terms of finance and or politi-
cal protection -- will become even more powerful (integration of gas, multi-utilities). 
These companies used all categories of integration and expansion to consolidate their 
market power and to build into multi-national players. 
Table 4.4 summarises the number and values of key European mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A). The actual figures are somewhat scattering, mainly due to individual definitions 
and data basis of the different sources. However, some general trends and patterns 
(Codognet 2002, PwC 2003) can be isolated. Most M&A occurred after 1998, with a 
peak in 2001. 
With regard to the motivation for M&A, a qualitative survey reveals that increase in 
scale is the dominant driver, be it in physical production capacity or in number of  
customers (PwC, 2003). Scale i.e. a strong capital basis, asset protection and protection 
of market share is essential in an industry that is infrastructure- and capital-intensive. 
Emergent strategies of electricity producers  19
 
  Value of M&A
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
year
bi
o $
 
  
 
  
Figure 4.1 Value of M&A (bio $). 
Source: Average of Ellul (2001), Codognet (2002) and PwC (2003). 
 
Table 4.4 Number and Value (bio$) of M&A in the European electricity markets. 
 Source 90-96 97-02 98 99 00 01 02 03 
Number (Codognet)   8 13 28 31 15  
 (Ellul)   11 17 43 21   
 (PwC)      64 157 118 
 (Someren) 400 630       
Value (Codognet)   3 12 19 38 22  
 (Ellul)   22 26 58 42   
 (PwC)      55 37 15 
Sources: Ellul (2001), Codognet (2002), PwC (2003), Someren (2004).  
 
Therefore it is not surprising, that “bigger size” is the key motivator for M&A (the two 
uppermost factors in Table 4.5). Differentiation (new products) and focus (specific target 
groups) are considered less important (last three factors in Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5 Driving Factors for M&A.  
  
Scale for competitive advantage  3.6 
Acquiring new customers 3.6 
Geographic expansion 3.4 
Creating an inherent hedge 3.3 
Strengthen focus on core business 2.9 
Broaden product portfolio 2.8 
 Source: PwC survey (2003). 
NB The driving factors are not mutually exclusive. 
Note: 5=major driver, 1=not a driver. 
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Table 4.6 Key markets for expansion. 
Eon: IT IT no large acquisitions 
RWE DE,UK, CEE, US no major acquisitions 
Vattenfall DE, Poland, SCAN consolidate DE business 
Electrabel FR, IT, Iberia, CEE France 20%share, merge with medium to create key player 
EdF/EnBW K, IT, Iberia, CEE make EnBW work, gas interest  
Source: PwC, 2003. 
 
To conclude, liberalisation introduced competition, but competition raised return to size 
and market power and mergers are the easiest way to grow: the domination of a few key 
actors has increased by size, integration and multi-utility (i.e. companies that provide 
gas, water and waste services next to electricity). Mergers and acquisitions peaked in 
2001 and have since dropped to pre-liberalisation levels. A learning and digesting phase 
has started (Someren 2004, PwC 2003). But a number of EU players are still waiting to 
invest (PwC 2003). Table 4.6 summarises acquisition intentions and markets of interest 
of some main players. 
We can therefore expect a continuation of the concentration process. 
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5. Emergent market behaviour 
This chapter presents evidence of emergent strategies of electricity companies. In order 
to focus the discussion, we repeat the five propositions in Chapter 3 that had to do with 
the Boston Portfolio Analysis and with Porter's Typology of Business Strategies. For 
each Proposition, we present the evidence and formulate conclusions. Chapter 7 will 
summarise all conclusions.  
• Proposition 1: Large players on the European electricity market will show a 'cash 
cow' strategy. They will invest their cash flow with the aim to increase market 
shares. Therefore, large players will acquire smaller companies.  
The major conclusion of a recent assessment of business strategies is that the cash cow 
strategy is predominant among the dominant electricity companies. Researchers describe 
business behaviour as 'autonomy-minded, short-term opportunistic and large-scale  
globally oriented'. 'The overriding strategic aim has been and still is, to grow in size' 
(Ederer, 2003). Section 4.2 provided additional evidence for the dominance of growth 
strategies.   
An interesting example is the strategy of E.ON, the third biggest electricity company in 
Europe, after EDF and RWE. In the 2004-2006 period, E.ON plans to spend 40% of total 
investments in acquisitions and 60% in equipment. This provides E.ON with an acquisi-
tion budget of 5.5 billion euros. If opportunities arise to increase market shares, the  
company will take them (E.ON, 2004).   
An interesting observation is that ownership does not seem to matter. As presented in 
Chapter 4, only 2 of 12 dominant companies in EMELIE countries are privately owned. 
However, not only E.ON and Electrabel are busy acquiring other firms, also state owned 
Vattenfall and EDF and regional owned RWE are actively buying other companies.  
Evidently, market structure determines company behaviour. This rule could in the past 
also be observed with state owned companies in non-regulated markets like oil and 
chemicals. 
Several authors have pointed out that market power rests with electricity generators 
(Newbery, 2002; Kennedy, 2003). In a more detailed analysis Bergmann, 2002 shows 
that monopoly profits are likely to appear when the number of independent generators 
decreases below a critical number. According to his research, a minimum of four inde-
pendent companies is necessary to enable a proper functioning of the market. In retro-
spect, Newbery, 2002 argued that two generators in UK in 1992 were too few. There-
fore, Newbery welcomes initiatives of the British regulator to enforce a split up of gen-
eration capacity among several companies. In line with Newbery, several researchers 
have warned for too little competition in electricity markets. They favour a split up of 
generators or to split generators from distributors (Matthes and Poetzsch, 2002; Speck, 
2003; De Joode et al., 2004). In an advice to the Dutch Regulator, Newbery et al., 2003, 
warned for strategic market power of Electrabel in case of integration of the Benelux 
markets.   
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• Answer on Proposition 1: Affirmative. 
• Proposition 2: Small players on the European electricity market will end up in a 
'dog' strategy. Their only way out is a sell out to a large company. 
German developments in 1999-2002, as analysed in Kemfert, 2003, are a spectacular  
example of strong concentration. In 1999, at the start of full market opening, Germany 
had about one hundred electricity producers. One year later, 10 companies dominated the 
market, among whom 6 belonged to Europe's Top 30 (Eurelectric, 2003). Another year 
later, the remaining ten had merged into the big four E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall 
(Sweden). Only a veto of the German Competition Authority prevented further concen-
tration (Matthes and Poetzsch, 2002). Lise et al, 2002 showed that small companies had 
little choice than to sell out to a large company. Indeed, small companies were pushed 
from the market by large, low cost producers and found themselves trapped in a loss 
making position. 
On a smaller scale, concentration took place in the Nordic markets and in Britain. In 
Scandinavia in 2001, Birka (Sweden) was acquired by Fortum (Finland), while Sydkraft 
(Sweden) was acquired by E.ON (Germany) and Statkraft (Norway). Until 2000, the 
NordPool electricity markets showed a healthy level of competition: the five largest 
companies provided 52% of all electricity. Since the 2001 mergers, 3 companies provide 
more than 50% of Nordic production. This is at the edge of on acceptable market  
concentration (Matthes and Poetzsch, 2002). Quantitative information about these  
developments can be found in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4.  
In the UK, various companies came into being after the split up of the two dominant 
generators (Newbery, 2002). Meanwhile, several of these companies have been taken 
over by RWE (Germany), E.ON (Germany) and EDF (France). In retrospect, a duopoly 
at the national level has been replaced by a web of international cross-ownerships. The 
UK developments show that international cross-ownership has quickly grown in impor-
tance on the European electricity markets. 
For Denmark and Netherlands the evidence is undecided, as long as public owners are 
not allowed to sell shares to other parties. In Denmark, the ban to sell more than 15% of 
shares internationally has recently been lifted (Verseput, 2004). In the Netherlands, the 
situation is complicated. Electrabel and E.ON have acquired part of the regionally organ-
ised electricity providers. For the remaining Dutch owned companies Nuon and Essent, 
the national government intends to allow majority ownership by foreign companies, but 
only after the complete unbundling of production and network operations. Recent  
publications mention the year 2009 to allow sales of public shares (Energie Nederland, 
2004A).  
A final word about the meaning of small. In this section we discussed the position of the 
smaller integrated companies that figure in Appendices I and II. Below this group, a lot 
of very small companies is active in the electricity markets. In the EMELIE model, these 
niche players are consolidated into a fringe group, a group of companies that is unable to 
influence electricity prices. However, experts are convinced that many niche players will 
survive, especially when they have direct access to low cost production facilities, e.g. 
hydropower (EMELIE Workshop 11 June 2004, Amsterdam). Moreover, niche players 
are important for market transparency and price-making. 
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• Answer on proposition 2: Yes in Germany and the Nordic countries. Probably yes in 
Denmark and the Netherlands, but evidence will only appear after bans on foreign 
ownership have been lifted. 
• Proposition 3: In the 2004-2007 transition period, innovation will be driven by small 
companies. Most of these 'wild cats' will not survive. Remaining 'stars' will in due 
course be acquired by large players in the electricity market.  
Experts of the electricity sector observe a lack of innovation (Kunneke, 2003). Strategic 
analysts explain why little innovation is an attractive scenario for major companies.  
Innovation could introduce a whole range of disturbances in the profitable industry struc-
ture. It might create new products, in which the majors do not have large market shares. 
It might create new markets requiring large sums of investments. Innovation may also 
introduce product segmentation. A split up of the market means that oligopolistic market 
power no longer holds, which would diminish profitability (Ederer, 2003). Therefore, 
Ederer argues that it is against the interest of dominant companies to innovate. 
Large hydro power has a long, profitable history and is normally not considered as part 
of renewable energy sources. With regard to the 'new', as yet unprofitable, renewables 
wind, biomass and photovoltaic solar, it seems that smaller companies often took a role 
as pioneer. Danish companies have become a frontrunner in wind power, the Dutch 
companies Essent and Nuon have been active for many years in biomass and photo-
voltaics. Related to these technical experiments, Essent and Nuon have become pioneer 
in the niche markets of green electricity (Hofman, 2002). In Finland, the smaller player 
PVO has become a specialist in biomass fuels. In contrast, a major company like Elec-
trabel seems to be reluctant to take part in wind power experiments (Electrabel, 2004).  
With regard to trade, liberalisation brings new traders to the market. In preparation to 
full market liberalisation in the Netherlands, several new traders have entered the  
electricity market. In 2003, there was a shock when the fast growing independent player  
EnergyXS went bankrupt. Caused by a price spike on the power exchange spot market, 
costs overran revenues. Single standing traders, without a back up of own production  
capacity, are vulnerable to price spikes. So far, the most successful new trader in the 
Netherlands is Energiebedrijf.com, that in its own words chooses for a steady growth. 
Until now financed by venture capital, the director of Energiebedrijf.com does not  
exclude that future growth demands participation of a large electricity company from 
abroad (De Heus, 2004).  
Traders in electricity need a well functioning power market. A recent article casts doubt 
on the liquidity of the Amsterdam Power Exchange APX : the number of players and the 
volume of trade remain limited (Van Grieken, 2004). In a recent report, the Dutch regu-
lator DTe observes that market volume stagnates and that in 2003 the number of traders 
on the APX market actually decreased. DTe urges for additional measures to secure a 
liquid and transparent market (DTe, 2004A). In the Netherlands, market players can 
choose between bilateral contracts and trade on the Power Exchange. It has become clear 
that large players prefer bilateral contracts. As a result, the number of players and the 
volume of trade on the open power market remain limited. This allows electricity gen-
erators to dominate the market and prevent aggressive price competition. This develop-
ment support Newbery's observation that generators dominate the markets (Newbery, 
2002). 
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• Answer on Proposition 3: Large market players show little interest in innovation. 
Small and medium sized players offer interesting innovation in production and trade. 
It remains to be seen how many innovative companies will survive as independent 
players five years from now. 
• Proposition 4: The low cost strategy will be dominant for electricity producers, both 
in traditional markets and in emergent focus markets. 
The two private majors E.ON and Electrabel advertise as a low cost provider (E.ON, 
2004; Electrabel, 2004). The same applies to state owned Vattenfall (Vattenfall, 2004). 
Table 5.1 shows the list of expansionist’ companies from Chapter 4 and their share on 
fuels with low variable costs (hydro, nuclear, coal and lignite). With the exception of 
Electrabel and Fortum, the percentage of low cost fuels is over 90%. 
Table 5.1 Expansionistic electricity companies and share of low cost fuels. 
Company Participations Low cost fuels  
(hydro, nuclear, coal, lignite) 
E.ON E.ON Benelux (100%); Sydkraft (55%) 93% 
Electrabel Electrabel Nederland (100%) 55% 
Vattenfall Vattenfall Deutschland (94%) 90% 
EDF EnBW (35%) 91% 
Statkraft Sydkraft (45%) 99% 
Fortum Fortum Sweden (100%) 54% 
Source: Appendix 1 and 2. 
 
With regard to trade, Germany and the Netherlands have seen massive imports of 'cheap' 
nuclear electricity (Eurelectric, 2004). In this way, German and Dutch producers try to 
benefit from the abundantly available nuclear capacity in France.  
As for niche markets, the 2002-2004 market for green electricity in the Netherlands  
experienced spectacular developments. Triggered by a government subsidy for every 
'green KWh' sold to end customers, electricity companies searched markets for cheap 
green electricity. In the end, they bought hydropower from existing plants in Germany 
and Austria. Transmission to the Netherlands caused congestion in the interconnectors 
(Van Damme and Zwart, 2003). Because the subsidies did not bring many new  
investments in renewables, the liberal scheme was partly abolished in 2003: Investment 
subsidies for renewables have been reformulated and an eco-tax on renewable consump-
tion has been introduced (Linderhof et al., 2003). 
• Answer on Proposition 4: Yes; 
• Proposition 5: A differentiation strategy will only be possible with financial support 
of governments. Without government support, product innovations will be trapped in 
a differentiation focus, serving market at the fringe.  
As discussed under Proposition 3, it is of major importance for large companies to  
prevent market segmentation. Any initiative towards product differentiation brings risks 
of market segmentation, which may result in unforeseen market developments and in a 
break down of the cash cow strategy.  
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The discussion under Proposition 3 also showed that expansionist’ companies pay  
limited attention to renewables. Major players want to get involved in interesting  
initiatives, but they leave it to smaller companies to act as pioneers.  
How can small, innovative companies (Denmark, Holland) break out of their niche  
markets? In general, new technologies cost more than well-established low cost  
technologies like hydro, nuclear, coal and lignite. Substantial and predictable support 
schemes are necessary to accomplish learning effects. Support schemes for wind  
(Denmark; Germany), renewables in general (Holland) and CHP (Holland) enabled them 
to gain significant market shares.  
• Answer on Proposition 5: Yes. 
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6. Regulatory innovation? 
Chapter 6 presents evidence of new strategies in business-government interactions. All 
actors involved in the process of liberalisation concede that some type of regulation will 
always be necessary. Re-regulation certainly applies to transmission and distribution 
networks; opinions diverge when it comes to regulation of electricity production, trade 
and sales. In order to focus the discussion, we repeat the four propositions in Chapter 3 
that had to do with Williamson's New Institutional Economics and with Tinbergen's  
Theory of Economic Policy. After presenting evidence on each Proposition, we formulate 
our conclusion. Chapter 7 summarises all conclusions.  
• Proposition 6: The Dutch electricity markets will change from a regional monopoly 
into a regulated oligopoly. It is not a priory clear whether social welfare, including 
transaction costs, in the new situation will be higher than in the old situation. 
With the EMELIE model as it stands, it is not possible to make a full impact analysis on 
social welfare. A complete cost-benefit analysis includes four types of effects: direct  
effects, indirect effects, external effects and distribution effects (De Joode et al, 2004). 
Leaving complex discussions on distributional effects aside, EMELIE produces direct 
(economic) effects and physical environmental effects. With the help of shadow prices, it 
is theoretically possible to convert physical emissions into monetary external costs  
(ExternE, 2003). The calculation of indirect effects demands an additional, macro-
economic model. 
If a full calculation of social welfare is not possible, what can we say then of a partial 
analysis? Direct transaction costs of liberalisation seem to be limited (see actor list in 
Table 3.3): Infrastructure costs of the Amsterdam Power Exchange APX amount to 5 
million euro, the new Energy Regulator Dte costs 7 million euro annually (De Joode, 
2004). According to one author, experiences suggest that the limited APX costs are of a 
much smaller magnitude than welfare benefits resulting from increased competition 
(Speck, 2003). In contrast, another author of the same institute CPB suspect that full 
transaction costs of electricity liberalisation may not always outweigh efficiency gains 
(Mulder, 2004). To answer this question, additional research is needed. 
Results of EMELIE scenarios show an interesting paradox: a scenario with strategic  
behaviour of companies (STRA) shows better environmental results than a scenario with 
competitive behaviour (COMP) (Lise et al, 2002). Lower emissions in STRA means that 
external costs are lower. However, higher electricity prices in STRA mean that consumer 
surplus is less than in COMP. For a full comparison between STRA and COMP it is 
necessary to balance higher consumer surplus versus lower external costs. A complicat-
ing factor is that the pre-liberalisation situation, as depicted in the reference scenario 
(REF; cost minimisation), differs from both STRA and COMP. Only additional research, 
not planned in EMELIE, can shed light on welfare differences between the STRA, 
COMP and REF scenarios.   
• Answer on Proposition 6: Direct transaction costs caused by the Power Exchange 
APX and the Regulator DTe are limited. Benefits probably outweigh direct costs.  
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A full cost-benefit analysis is not possible within the EMELIE framework and has not 
been tried elsewhere;  
• Proposition 7: The policy goal 'security of supply' demands policy instruments  
additional to the measures stipulated in the EU Directive 2003/54/EC on electricity 
liberalisation. 
The EU goals of electricity liberalisation, efficiency, security of supply and environ-
mental improvements, are potentially conflicting (Speck and Mulder, 2003). Therefore, a 
careful analysis is necessary to assess whether goals are mutually compatible or not. The 
EU Directive 2003/54/EC acknowledges that security of supply may not be guaranteed 
in liberalised markets. Because it is not possible yet to clearly define the risks, member 
states have become obliged to monitor generation capacity and to prepare actions to  
ensure security of supply (EU, 2003). 
The emergent discussion has brought a lot of suggestions for specific measures to secure 
supply. Table 6.1 presents an overview. Measures 1 to 3 aim to maintain sufficient  
capacity for electricity generation (supply side). Measures 4 and 5 aim to influence  
demand, in order to maximise peak production (4) or to limit peak demand (5). 
Table 6.1 Potential policy measures to guarantee security of supply. 
 Measure Effective and efficient? 
1A Tender for Capacity Investment Effective (Knops) 
1B Tender for mothballed Reserve Effective, but not efficient (De Joode) 
2 Capacity Requirements & Markets   Effective, but not efficient (De Joode) 
3 Capacity payments to producers Not effective (De Joode, 2004) 
4 Reliability Contracts (Call Options)  No judgement found 
5 Subscriptions on maximum peak demand Technically not yet feasible (Knops) 
Source: Knops, 2003 and De Joode et al., 2004. 
 
Most attention in the Netherlands goes to measures to guarantee sufficient capacity. The 
economic think tank CPB recently analysed three measures on effectiveness and  
efficiency in the Dutch situation (De Joode et al., 2004). They assessed a Tender for 
mothballed reserves (1B), Capacity markets (2) and Capacity payments (3). About  
capacity payments (3), their opinion is negative: Payments that amount to 10 €\MWh 
will cost 105 million euro annually, but bring almost no new capacity. The Tender for 
mothballed reserves (1B) and Capacity Markets (2) are potentially effective and cost 129 
respectively 145 million euro annually. In the economic framework of a cost-benefit 
analysis based on historical risks for blackouts, De Joode et al. consider none of the three 
measures to be efficient. However, public policies that strive for maximal risk avoidance 
could find costs acceptable. Recently, the Dutch authorities announced to opt for  
Measure 1B: They plan to tender for a mothballed reserve of about 750 MW, expectedly 
costing 43 million euro annually. Although critical about this type of measure in general, 
the CPB think tank considers the proposed measure as acceptable in the ongoing process 
towards a liberalised electricity market (Energie Nederland,2004A). 
Next to capacity availability and capacity utilisation, information and organisation of the 
electricity market demand attention as well. An EMELIE expert meeting underscored the 
importance of transparent and liquid electricity markets (EMELIE Workshop, 11 June 
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2004, Amsterdam). Information requirements on the availability of spare capacity are 
crucial to secure supply. In absence of instantaneous information about actually used and 
mothballed capacity, generators can strategically withhold capacity and network  
operators cannot dispatch optimally. In many countries, information requirements on 
electricity generators are insufficient at this moment (Kennedy, 2003). The Dutch  
regulator DTe worries about market transparency caused by insufficient information 
available to all market parties. DTe proposes to publish information about electricity 
traded on future markets and about electricity actually being produced, be it with some 
time delay. Without such additional information requirements, a proper functioning of 
the market is doubtful (DTe, 2004A)     
• Answer on Proposition 7: At this moment, most attention goes to information  
requirements on production capacity and capacity utilisation. Measures to guarantee 
capacity are intensively debated, but implementation -if any- will not be forthcoming 
on short notice. 
• Proposition 8: The policy goal 'environmental protection' demands policy  
instruments additional to the measures stipulated in the EU Directive 2003/54/EC on 
electricity liberalisation. 
The EU and national governments have a long tradition of policy measures to reduce the 
environmental impacts of electricity production. These policies include on the one hand 
measures to reduce pollution from fossil fuel plants, on the other hand policies to support 
use of renewables (hydro, wind, biomass, solar) and use of CHP (Combined Heat and 
Power production).    
The EU has specific Directives on Large Furnaces, renewables and CHP, that will not 
become redundant once the Liberalisation Directives have been fully implemented. At 
the national scale, one finds a plethora of schemes to support renewables and CHP. Most 
of these schemes support supply: they subsidise investment costs or give price guaran-
tees for electricity delivered to the public network. Schemes to increase demand are rare, 
but potentially more powerful (Bongaerts and Dogbe, 2003). As described under  
Proposition 4, a 2002-2004 demand support scheme for 'green electricity' in the Nether-
lands showed a tremendous success in terms of increased demand. Unfortunately, the 
expected investments in renewables did not materialise, so the scheme was partly  
abandoned (Van Damme and Zwart, 2003). 
In the literature, one can regularly find pleas for a premium on decentralised power, in 
EMELIE terms a premium on the production fringe. The argument runs that decentral-
ised power or distributed generation (DG) must be subsidised because it limits capacity 
requirements on distribution networks. As a result, in the long-term network costs can be 
avoided (Matthes and Poetzsch, 2002). In practice, decentralised power will mostly  
consist of CHP and renewables. According to Groenhuijse, 2004, a generic plea for  
subsidy on decentralised power is there, but time and place dependent studies must show 
whether avoided network costs really occur.  
• Answer on Proposition 8: Yes, separate instruments for environmental protection at 
EU and at national levels will remain. 
• Proposition 9: Public agencies have to provide standards for security of supply for 
captive users. Public agencies must also get the instruments to enforce these  
standards.  
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Electricity liberalisation typically has several phases, starting with large electricity users 
and ending with households (EU, 2003). Large customers (industries) have countervail-
ing market power and can opt for alternatives to the public grid like CHP. In negotiations 
between electricity companies and large customers, the power equilibrium may result in 
acceptable agreements on security of supply: minimum standards, penalties etc. 
Households and small business have much less bargaining power. At the same time, they 
have no alternative to the public grid. Therefore, we expect that equitable rules for  
security of supply will not automatically emerge. Public agencies, for example the  
Regulator, could play a role here.  
From an economic theory perspective, Shestalova, 2002 favours heavy penalties on  
electricity distributors in case of network failure. The Dutch network Regulator DTe  
prepares plans to implement such a common incentive scheme, where the level of the 
penalties must be based on consumer preferences for security of supply (DTe, 2004).  
A survey has shown that Dutch households appreciate the historically low number of 
blackouts (one blackout in four years on average), but could accept deterioration to one 
or two blackouts a year (Baarsma, 2004). In the months to come, DTe has to decide what 
to do with these results.  
• Answer on Proposition 9: The Dutch network Regulator plans to implement a 
scheme to publicly penalises distributors in case of non-delivery. In general, the role 
of public agencies in security of supply is undecided. 
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7. Conclusions 
Appendix 3 summarises our nine propositions and answers. From the answers, we derive 
the following conclusions: 
The trend towards market concentration remains. Concentration Standards of Competi-
tion Authorities decide on maximum concentration levels, not the market itself. The 
number of firms in the European electricity market is typically endogenous, with a 
minimum number per country set by the competition authorities (propositions 1 and 2).  
Expansionist’ companies strive for a secure, low cost production of electricity. They 
want to retain their integrated business structure, being active not only in electricity  
production and trade, but also in distribution and sales. Niche players experiment with 
new production and trade arrangements (propositions 3 and 4).  
Only well structured, lasting policy arrangements can bring a secure footing for alterna-
tive energy sources like renewables and CHP. Wind is successful in Denmark and  
Germany, but unsuccessful in the Netherlands and UK. The Netherlands and Denmark 
have promoted CHP successfully (proposition 5). 
Direct transaction costs of electricity liberalisation can remain limited and benefits 
probably outweigh costs. However, a full assessment of costs and benefits of liberalisa-
tion is not available (proposition 6). 
As for environmental protection, separate instruments at the EU and national levels will 
remain. As for security of supply, discussions focus on instruments to maintain sufficient 
generating capacity. The necessity to introduce new instruments for security of supply is 
hotly debated and undecided (propositions 7 and 8). 
The role of public agencies in setting standards for security of supply is controversial. 
The Dutch Regulator DTe plans to introduce penalties for non-delivery (proposition 9). 
From our conclusions, we derive the following implications for the use of the EMELIE 
model: 
• Companies try to avoid full COMPetition at any prize, they work towards STRAtegic 
market behaviour; 
• In model terms, the game played by the electricity firms looks a bit like “strategic en-
try deterrence through capacity choice”, analysed by Spence, 1977 and Dixit, 1980; 
• Market concentration remains the dominant trend. To prevent quasi-monopolies, 
forced splitting of companies comes into the picture. France and Belgium are  
candidates, but perhaps Germany and the Netherlands as well; 
• Because Regulators will not accept more mergers at the national scale, dominant 
companies look for international opportunities. As soon as public shares become 
available to private companies, international cross-ownership will increase; 
• Liberalisation will not automatically accomplish environmental targets. Separate  
environmental instruments remain necessary; 
• Opinions diverge about specific measures to guarantee security of supply. Some  
argue that 'clever' privatisation will accomplish security of supply, others argue that 
investment schemes must guarantee sufficient generation capacity. 
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Appendix I. Integrated electricity companies in EMELIE 
countries 
Table I.1 Integrated electricity companies in EMELIE countries. 
Name Website  Ownership1 Independent?2 Activities3 
Germany     
E.ON Energie 
 
Eon.com P Yes 
Owns:  
Sydkraft 55% 
Benelux100% 
P,D,T,Tr  
(integrated) 
RWE 
 
RWE.com L + P  
(shares 51%  
Institutions 
33% L 
Yes P,D,T,Tr  
(integrated) 
Vattenvall 
 
Vattenfall.com S (=Sweden) S =Sweden (integrated) 
EnBW 
 
Enbw.com R + S  
(52% regions, 
35% EDF,  
13% mixed) 
Yes P,D,T,Tr 
(integrated) 
France     
EDF 
 
Edf.com S Yes 
Owns: 
EnBW 35% 
P,D,T,Tr  
(integrated) 
Netherlands     
E.ON Benelux Eon.com P S =Germany (integrated) 
     
Electrabel  
 
Electrabel.com P  
(51% Suez,  
4%municipalities
45% free float 
S of Suez (FR) P,D,T,Tr  
(integrated) 
Nuon 
 
Nuon.com R + L Yes P,D,T,Tr 
(integrated) 
Essent 
 
Essent.nl R + L Yes P,D,T,Tr  
(integrated) 
Sweden     
Vattenfall 
 
Vattenfall.com S (owns 
100% of 
shares) 
Yes 
Owns: 
Deutschland 
94% 
P,D,T,Tr 
(integrated) 
Sydkraft 
 
Sydkraft.se P  
(55% E.ON, 
45% Statkraft) 
S of E.ON 
(DE) 
P,D,T,Tr 
(integrated) 
Fortum 
 
Fortum.com S (=Finland) =Finland (integrated) 
Finland     
Fortum 
 
Fortum.com S Yes P,D,T,Tr 
(integrated) 
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PVO 
 
Pvo.fi P (owned by 
companies)+L 
Yes P, D, Tr 
Norway     
Statkraft 
 
Statkraft.no S Yes 
Owns: 
Sydkraft45% 
P,D,Tr (national 
grid separate) 
Denmark     
Elsam 
 
Elsam.com R Yes P,D,T (no trade) 
Energi E2 
 
Energie2.com L, R Yes P,D,T,Tr  
(integrated) 
Note: In italics, companies are owned by another company in this table. 
1 Ownership: P = private, S = state, R = regional, L= local gov. 
2 Independent? Yes = yes, S= subsidiary from. 
3 Activities: P = production, D = distribution, T = transport, Tr = trade. 
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Appendix II. Production and sales of integrated 
electricity companies 
Table II.1 Production and sales of integrated electricity companies in EMELIE  
countries. 
Name Countries1 Sales 
(Billion 
euros)  
Sales 
(TWh) 
Production2 Fuel mix3 
Germany      
E.ON Energie 
 
DE, NL, SE, 
FI, (UK,HU) 
19.5 
(11.6 
electra) 
262 156 
(25.2 GW) 
N 51%, C 24%,  
Lignite 7%, G 7%,  
H 11%. 
RWE 
 
DE, (UK), 
(PL,SL,HU) 
44 268 184  
(36.5 GW) 
N 23%, C 18%, Lignite 
42%, G 12%, CHP 2%, 
W 3% 
Vattenvall 
 
=Sweden    Lignite + CHP 
EnBW 
 
DE , 
(CH,ES) 
8.6 (6.2 
electra) 
97 53 N 50%, C 33%, H 17% 
France      
EDF 
 
FR, DE, 
(UK,IT,HU, 
PL) 
48.6 
FR26.7 
525 486 
(121 GW) 
N 86%, C 5%,  
H 8% 
Netherlands      
E.ON 
 
=Germany  14  
(1.7 GW) 
C + G 
Electrabel 
 
BE, NL, DE, 
FR, (PL, ES, 
IT, HU) 
14.853 
(8.979 
electra) 
104 107 
(25 GW; 
NL  
4.6 GW) 
N 45%, G 33%,  
C 10%, L 3%,  
CHP 8%, H 1%, 
W 0% 
    108  
Nuon 
 
NL, BE, DE 4.7 38  31  
(3.8 GW) 
N 3%, C 22% 
G 34%, CHP-G 17%, 
W 24% (20% import) 
Essent 
 
NL, DE 6.9 
(electra 
3.0) 
48 18  
(3.2 GW) 
N 5%, C 35%, G 18%, 
CHP 40%, W 2%    
Sweden      
Vattenfall 
 
SE, DE, FI, 
PL, DK, NL 
12.307 185 156 (SE78 , 
DE 75) 
SE: N 50%, H 45%  
DE: C, CHP 
Sydkraft 
 
SE, FI, DK, 
NO 
2.2 
(1.1 elec-
tra) 
33 25  
(31 in 2001; 
6.4 GW) 
N 55%, G 5%,  
H 40%, W 0% 
Fortum 
 
=Finland PM  (6.3 GW)  
Finland      
Fortum 
 
FI, SE, NO, 
(UK, ES) 
11.4 (1.9 
electra) 
54 52 
(5.3 GW) 
N 47%, C 7%,  
CHP 7%, H 39% 
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PVO 
 
FI 0.67 21 16 
(3.9 GW) 
N 50%, C 25%,  
G 3%, H 9%,  
Biomass 13% 
Norway      
Statkraft NO 0.55 34 39.2 
(8.9 GW) 
H 99%, W1% 
Denmark      
Elsam DK, PL, UK 0.95 13 16 
(4.2 GW) 
CHP 85% (C 71%,  
L 1%, G 14%), H 9%, 
W 5%. 
Energi E2 DK, SE, SP 0.9 13 13 C 40%, Orimulsion 
22%, L 2%, G 22%,  
H 8%, W 6%. 
In italics: Companies are owned by another company in this table. 
1 Countries: bold = core countries. 
2 Production: own production in TWh. 
3 Fuel mix: N/C/L/G/O/CHP/H/W. 
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Appendix III. Propositions and answers 
Proposition 1 
Large players on the European electricity market will show a 'cash cow' strategy.  
They will invest their cash flow with the aim to increase market shares. Therefore, large 
players will acquire smaller companies. 
Answer on proposition 1: Affirmative. 
Proposition 2 
Small players on the European electricity market will end up in a 'dog' strategy.  
Their only way out is a sell out to a large company. 
Answer on proposition 2: Yes in Germany and the Nordic countries.  
Probably yes in Denmark and the Netherlands, but evidence will only appear after bans 
on foreign ownership have been lifted.  
Proposition 3 
In the 2004-2207 transition period, innovation will be driven by small companies.  
Most of these 'wild cats' will not survive. Remaining 'stars' will in due course be  
acquired by large players in the electricity market.  
Answer on proposition 3: Large market players show little interest in innovation. Small 
and medium sized players offer interesting innovation in production and trade. It remains 
to be seen how many innovative companies will survive as independent players five 
years from now.  
Proposition 4 
The low cost strategy will be dominant for electricity producers, both in traditional  
markets and in emergent focus markets. 
Answer on proposition 4: Yes.  
Proposition 5 
A differentiation strategy will only be possible with financial support of governments. 
Without government support, product innovations will be trapped in a differentiation  
focus, serving market at the fringe.  
Answer on proposition 5: Yes. 
Proposition 6 
The Dutch electricity markets will change from a regional monopoly into a regulated 
oligopoly. It is not a priory clear whether social welfare, including transaction costs, in 
the new situation will be higher than in the old situation. 
Answer on proposition 6: Direct transaction costs caused by the Power Exchange APX 
and the Regulator DTe are limited. Benefits probably outweigh direct costs. A full cost-
benefit analysis is not possible within the EMELIE framework and has not been tried 
elsewhere.  
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Proposition 7 
The policy goal 'security of supply' demands policy instruments additional to the  
measures stipulated in the EU Directive 2003/54/EC on electricity liberalisation. 
Answer on proposition 7: At this moment, most attention goes to information require-
ments on production capacity and capacity utilisation. Measures to guarantee capacity 
seem to be most popular, but implementation will not be forthcoming at short notice.  
Proposition 8 
The policy goal 'environmental protection' demands policy instruments additional to the 
measures stipulated in the EU Directive 2003/54/EC on electricity liberalisation. 
Answer on proposition 8: Yes, separate instruments for environmental protection at EU 
and at national levels will remain.  
Proposition 9 
Public agencies have to provide standards for security of supply for captive users. Public 
agencies must also get the instruments to enforce these standards.  
Answer on proposition 9: The Dutch network Regulator plans to implement a scheme 
that publicly penalises distributors in case of non-delivery. In general, the role of public 
agencies in security of supply is undecided. 
